The historiographical debate surrounding Progressive attitudes about World War I is a complex problem. William Leuchtenburg initiated the controversy with his pioneering argument that Progressives supported imperialism and a vigorous foreign policy. Eric Goldman and Arthur Link countered with the charge that Progressives viewed World War I as a blow to domestic reform. The Goldman-Link arguments emphasized isolationist fears of big business forces which influenced the direction of American foreign policy. Subsequent research has shown that economic arguments were generally used to disguise sectional and political differences. The work of Howard Allen, Warren Sutton and Walter Trattner among others concluded that Progressives held widely divergent attitudes upon American foreign policy. Recently, Barton J. Bernstein and Franklin A. Leib suggested a re-examination of Progressive attitudes upon foreign policy in light of regional, party and legislative interests. There has been very little study of the changes in Progressive attitudes upon foreign policy during American participation in World War I. Progressives often delivered quick responses to wartime problems, and their comments upon American foreign policy were never systematic. In terms of political philosophy, then, many Progressives appeared naive and emotional in their approach to foreign affairs. Yet, despite these difficulties, World War I forced individual Progressives to develop definite attitudes upon world affairs.

This article will analyze Senator Hiram W. Johnson of California in light of the World War I influences which shaped his attitudes upon foreign affairs. In April 1917 Johnson was sworn in as the junior senator from California after having established a national reputation as a two-term Progressive-Republican governor. Like many Progressives his past experience in foreign affairs was limited. Consequently, Johnson had developed neither
a philosophy nor an approach to foreign affairs. As a result of his World War I experiences, however, Johnson emerged as an intractable opponent of an internationalist foreign policy. His isolationism, then, was the direct result of his reaction to Wilsonian diplomacy.

The development of Johnson's isolationism evolved very subtly during the last eighteen months of World War I. The wartime atmosphere forced Johnson to vote for Democratic legislation that he found personally repugnant. Privately, however, he virulently criticized Wilson's leadership. Johnson's early criticism of the president reflected his belief that the Progressive spirit was dead. In 1916 Johnson re-entered the main-stream of Republican politics, but he was still committed to Progressive ideals. His initial frustration over the failure to instill Progressive attitudes into the rank and file Republican politician was summarized in a letter to a California Progressive, Chester Rowell, "to suggest a social program or domestic policy would simply afford an opportunity to those who believe in none to boll (sic) you over." Yet, for a brief moment, Johnson considered the possibility of using temporary wartime agencies to implement postwar Progressive reforms. He wrote his sons, Archibald and Hiram, Jr., that "we might make a radical, Progressive war program to which we could adhere and which might ultimately be of benefit to the movement so fastly waning and disintegrating." Johnson considered using wartime agencies for postwar reform only momentarily; he soon concluded that this practice would further increase Wilson's extraordinary presidential power. He informed his close friend, Sacramento Bee editor C. K. McClatchy, that progressivism was dead as a distinct party, but its principles could be developed within the Republican party. To others Johnson was even more explicit during the first few months of American involvement in World War I; he wrote a number of Californians that opposition to Wilson's diplomacy must be a highly organized movement within the Republican party.

In 1917-1918, then, Johnson moved to implement Progressive attitudes into Republican politics. In this attempt Johnson joined with erstwhile conservative opponents to attack Wilson's foreign policy. In reality, Johnson developed a rigidly conservative approach to foreign affairs during World War I. His close contacts
with President Theodore Roosevelt and Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana prompted Johnson to talk of protecting national honor through a highly defined foreign policy. Therefore, Johnson rigorously argued that American foreign policy must be wielded by capable moral leaders pursuing a clearly defined public policy. Acceptable policy, according to Johnson, included open diplomacy, consulting public opinion, and avoiding unnecessary outside influences. Johnson’s approach to foreign affairs emphasized maintaining traditional American freedoms in world affairs but with a minimum of contact with European governments. Johnson viewed Wilson’s close cooperation with the Allied powers as a detriment to the postwar peace settlement. The crucial turning point in Johnson’s avid opposition to Wilsonian diplomacy, however, resulted from the belief that big business unduly influenced the direction of American foreign policy. The charge of war profiteering stuck in Johnson’s mind in the early days of Senate debate over American involvement in World War I. In a few months the profiteering issue matured in Johnson’s mind, and he soon became a full fledged critic of Wilsonian diplomacy.  

In the first few months of American involvement in the war, however, Johnson found it difficult to reach firm conclusions about foreign affairs. He constantly quizzed his colleagues and close friends upon matters relating to foreign affairs, but he was unable to focus his thoughts upon international problems. Unlike his colleague, William E. Borah of Idaho, Johnson never bothered to expand his reading habits to include history and political science. The significance of Johnson’s academic disinterest in international relations is that he often suggested naive and impractical policies in foreign affairs. A specific example is Johnson’s Senate speech of May 11, 1917, when he suggested that Allied airplanes drop leaflets on German troops pointing out America’s industrial and military superiority. Once this fact was established firmly, Johnson argued, the German army would surrender. There is a clear relationship between Johnson’s failure to study questions of international affairs and his inability to satisfactorily respond to crises in American foreign policy.  

Johnson’s earliest reactions to American participation in World War I highlights his fears of excessive presidential power. “The popular branch of the government,” Johnson wrote, “seems
to have been paralyzed,” and reflected clearly “the will of the Chief Executive.” This early fear of Wilson’s power acted as a catalyst to Johnson’s eventual emergence as one of the sixteen irreconcilable senators who opposed the Treaty of Versailles.

In emerging as a leading isolationist spokesman Johnson was heavily influenced by the controversy over American war aims. It was not surprising that President Wilson found it difficult to define American policy, but Johnson viewed the president’s inability to carefully map out American war policy as a reflection of his inept leadership. “He is the leader of the American people,” Johnson wrote, “and he should speak in such clarion tones that all of the nations would understand.” Reflecting his California Progressive background, Johnson emphasized the necessity of careful planning and a clearly spelled out public policy. Unfortunately, he looked upon any sort of vacillation as political dishonesty. In the summer of 1917, Johnson’s correspondence reflected the dual notion of inept presidential leadership and unseen business influences. Wilson’s inability, according to Johnson, to make “plain the reasons for the war, our aims and our purposes, and what ultimately we expect to achieve...” reflected the president’s desire to fight the war solely with American money.

The idea of fighting with American dollars soon evolved into the belief that war profiteers were the motivating force behind Wilson’s foreign policy. This conviction resulted from a series of speeches by Wisconsin Senator Robert M. LaFollette against Wilson’s war resolution. LaFollette argued that German provocation alone had been insufficient to force the United States into war. LaFollette charged that wartime profiteering was a probable cause of America’s war declaration, and he presented an impressive array of statistics to back up his argument. LaFollette’s speeches remained in Johnson’s mind for months. Eventually, during the 1917 summer, LaFollette’s remarks brought the idea of economic conspiracy into the forefront of Johnson’s mind.

To understand the development of Johnson’s fears of excessive business influences upon American foreign policy, it is necessary to examine his reaction to four wartime measures—the Selective Service Act, the Espionage Act of 1917, the War Revenue Act, and, finally, the Sedition Act of 1918. These measures forced
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Johnson to articulate precise charges that business influences shaped Wilsonian diplomacy.

The first wartime measure, the Selective Service Act, convinced Johnson that the president was not interested in large scale European troop commitments. Initially, Johnson supported a selective service measure. However, when Wilson refused the services of Theodore Roosevelt’s Volunteer Brigade, Johnson argued that the president’s unwillingness to accept volunteers “transmutes the Republic from a fighting force for love of freedom and country into a military machine fighting under compulsion.” In Senate debate Johnson castigated Wilson’s leadership, and he urged the president to commit troops as well as American resources to the European conflict. Privately, Johnson accused the president of providing big business with unnecessary opportunities to profit from the war. Unless big business economized, Johnson reasoned, Wilson could not ask the American people to do the same.

It was the controversy over the question of wartime taxation that brought Johnson into the public limelight. In the debate upon the war revenue bill Johnson made a vigorous effort to take the profit out of war. He insisted that business interests which profited from the wartime economy pay a heavier tax. But it was the delay in the passage of the war revenue bill which convinced Johnson that the Wilson administration was doing a poor job of prosecuting the war. Introduced in April 1917, to finance the war effort, the war revenue bill was delayed while the Senate considered other legislation. The delay resulted in Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo asking for five billion dollars more than the original amount requested. As a result, Johnson, along with William E. Borah, Robert M. LaFollette and George W. Norris, supported an amendment to the bill providing for a 73 percent tax upon excessive war profits. The war revenue controversy catapulted Johnson into the forefront of Wilsonian critics.

It was the profiteering issue in the War Revenue Act, then, that solidified Johnson’s decision to actively oppose Wilsonian diplomacy. On August 20, Johnson displayed the degree of his displeasure in a blistering speech to the Senate upon profiteering. He argued that “blood money” coined by businessmen from the sale of munitions and the “plundering of the public” could be
controlled through stringent tax measures. In a highly emotional tone, he cried, "When we conscript the blood of the nation we must also conscript the wealth coined from that blood." In less bombastic rhetoric, Johnson concluded by charging the Senate Finance Committee with framing a bill that failed to tax big business. In spite of Johnson's arguments, the War Revenue Act easily passed through the Senate. Nonetheless, Johnson established a positive public image by opposing taxation on food, medicine, and other items important to daily life. It was the common man, Johnson concluded, that was burdened by the wartime taxes. Behind the entire controversy, however, was the alleged influence of big business.

In the controversy over more equitable taxation Johnson joined with a handful of senators to enscript wealth as well as men. During the course of the arguments surrounding the War Revenue Act, Johnson became concerned about maintaining traditional civil liberties. The Espionage Act of 1917, the first wartime curb upon civil liberties, worried Johnson. He viewed the vast undefined power given to the federal government as a possible weapon against critics of Wilsonian diplomacy. Johnson's immediate reaction was to label the measure as the most "outrageous, shameful and tyrannical measure ever passed by a free government." From the Senate floor he vowed to do everything within his power to defeat the Espionage Act.

In a major Senate speech, on May 10, 1917, Johnson eloquently painted the dangers of press censorship. If the postmaster general could exclude magazines and newspapers from the mails, Johnson argued, the next step would be to silence Wilson's critics. Censorship would make legitimate criticism of the government's war effort impossible. If American democracy was to continue as a world example, Johnson reasoned, it could not afford an excursion into European autocracy. Therefore, he defined his concern with the Espionage Act as one intent upon preserving free speech and democratic principles in the restrictive wartime atmosphere. Although voting for the passage of the act, Johnson did so with grave misgivings. As a shrewd professional politician he realized the political necessity of paying lip service to Wilson's policies. But Johnson viewed the Espionage Act as an unfortunate piece of legislation, because it would allow the president unusu-
ally excessive powers to deal with domestic politics. In order to prevent Wilson from fighting solely with American dollars, Johnson lectured his Senate colleagues, public opinion must be mobilized against the president.\footnote{28}

Almost a year after the Espionage Act the Wilson administration introduced the Sedition Act of 1918. Johnson objected to the Sedition Act because it allowed the postmaster general to control the mails. The administration could stop or intercept any piece of mail without a formal charge being lodged against an individual or an organization. Johnson considered this practice a dangerous breach of civil liberties, and he skillfully used the Senate chamber to press his argument that free speech existed only in Congress. The Sedition Act, Johnson asserted, was a "bill to suppress the freedom of the press . . . , and to prevent any man . . . from indulging in fair and decent expression . . . concerning the present Government."\footnote{29} Johnson warned that repressive laws would hamper the war effort. Basic civil liberties must be protected in wartime, Johnson warned, and he charged that President Wilson's wartime powers exceeded reasonable bounds of political power.\footnote{30}

Privately, Johnson informed his close friends that the president was attempting to "virtually place the nation under martial law."\footnote{31} Johnson's correspondence was filled with a foreboding about the future of American politics. He wrote his old California Progressive colleague, Meyer Lissner, and ex-President Theodore Roosevelt that Wilson was developing an "undisclosed scheme concerning the future of the Republic."\footnote{32} These fears of malevolent conspiracies prompted Johnson to intensify his criticism of Wilson's leadership. Public opinion, however, ignored Johnson's charges because of the success of the Allied war effort, the approaching congressional elections, and the interest in the peace settlement which dominated American politics.

As the armistice approached, Johnson's attitude toward American foreign policy reflected his lack of political power. His own feeling of powerlessness caused him to charge that Wilson "would make Congress appointive."\footnote{33} It was as a result of the Espionage and Sedition acts, then, that Johnson combined his fears of big business influences with the decline in civil liberties. Consequently, Johnson vowed to speak out against the factors causing Wilson

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Johnson vowed to work immediately upon organizing a political coalition that would defeat Wilson's peace plans.34

In conclusion, Johnson's opposition to Wilson's foreign policy reflected one Progressive-Republican's difficulty in accepting wartime changes. The presence and power of businessmen, who staffed the temporary wartime agencies, as well as the emergency legislation to prosecute the war, caused Johnson to fear an increase in presidential power that would destroy the Senate's historic role. Therefore, he emerged from World War I as a stringent critic of Wilsonian diplomacy. In 1919, Johnson was a key Senate figure in defeating the Treaty of Versailles, and his arguments were largely an extension of those he used to oppose Wilson in 1917-1918. Johnson's obsessive fear of presidential power characterized his critical approach to all future presidents, and he constantly attacked Republican and Democratic administrations for exceeding their authority in foreign affairs. Finally, Johnson's fear of executive power resulted from his belief that big business exerted a strong, if unseen, influence upon American foreign policy.35
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NOTES


7 Johnson to his sons, April 23, 1917, Johnson Papers. For an analysis of the Progressive decline see, Herbert F. Margules, "Recent Opinion on the Decline of the Progressive Movement," Mid-America, XLV (October 1963), 250-68. A recent revisionist study argues that American isolationism emerged as a result of Wilsonian neutrality, see John M. Cooper, Jr., The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and World War I, 1914-1917 (New York, 1969).

8 Johnson to Chester Rowell, April 10, 1917, Johnson Papers. For an analysis of the Progressive decline see, Herbert F. Margules, "Recent Opinion on the Decline of the Progressive Movement," Mid-America, XLV (October 1963), 250-68. A recent revisionist study argues that American isolationism emerged as a result of Wilsonian neutrality, see John M. Cooper, Jr., The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and World War I, 1914-1917 (New York, 1969).

9 Johnson to McClatchy, April 21, 1917, Johnson Papers.
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Johnson to his sons, April 3, 6, May 17, 1917; Johnson to Meyer Lissner, April 5, 9, June 6, 1917; Johnson to Joseph Scott, April 9, 1917; Johnson to Harris Weinstein, April 16, 1917, all in Johnson Papers. These letters, as well as incoming correspondence, reveal the degree of Progressive-Republican fragmentation upon American foreign policy. Recently, Peter G. Filene has suggested that Progressive diversity makes it impossible to define as a singular movement. See, “An Obituary for the Progressive Movement,” American Quarterly, XXII (Spring 1970), 20-34. Useful in analyzing one Progressive’s reaction to World War I is Neil Thorburn, “A Progressive and the First World War: Frederick G. Howe,” Mid-America, LI (April 1969), 108-18.


Johnson often commented in his letters upon his disinterest in reading history, political science or international relations, and he informed his sons that a good detective story was the only type of reading that he enjoyed. A useful article in comparing Johnson’s reading habits and his approach to foreign affairs with Idaho Senator William E. Borah is John M. Cooper, Jr., “William E. Borah, Political Thespian,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LVI (October 1965), 145-53.

Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2097-2100; Johnson to his sons, April 6, 1917, Johnson Papers.

Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson, Jr., April 7, 23, 1917, Johnson Papers.

Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, June 21, 1917, Johnson Papers.

Johnson to Chester Rowell, June 8, 1917, Johnson Papers.

Johnson to his sons, April 6, 1917; Johnson to Meyer Lissner, April 5, 1917; Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, April 21, 1917, all in Johnson Papers; Meyer Lissner to Hiram Johnson, April 17, 1917, Meyer Lissner Papers (Borel Collection, Stanford University); Belle and Fola LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette (2 vols., New York, 1953), II, 740; Lower, “Hiram Johnson and the Progressive Denouement,” pp. 265-68.

Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, April 27, 1917, Johnson Papers.


Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1481; New York Times, April 29, 1917, p. 2; May 18, 1917, p. 1; Johnson to McClatchy, May 1, 1917; Johnson to his sons, April 30, 1917; May 17, 1917, all in Johnson Papers.

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23 Johnson to Arthur Arlett, September 14, 1917; Johnson to John S. Chambers, September 15, 1917; Johnson to W. H. Leach, September 14, 1917; Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, September 17, 1917; Johnson to Theodore Roosevelt, September 8, 1917; Johnson to Joseph Scott, September 17, 1917, all in Johnson Papers; Belle and Fola LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette, II, 740-46; Richard Lowitt, George W. Norris: The Persistence of a Progressive, 1913-1933 (Urbana, 1971), p. 86.

24 Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, April 21, 1917, Johnson Papers.


29 Fite and Peterson, Opponents of War, p. 217; Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson, Jr., April 10, 1918; Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, February 6, 1918, all in Johnson Papers.


31 Johnson to Theodore Roosevelt, April 19, 1918, Johnson Papers.

32 Johnson to Meyer Lissner, May 7, 1918; Johnson to Theodore Roosevelt, May 6, 1918, all in Johnson Papers.

33 Johnson to Amy Johnson, August 31, 1918, Johnson Papers.

34 Ibid., July 8, 27, August 17, 1918; Johnson to Hiram W. Johnson, Jr., August 6, 28, 1918; Johnson to Meyer Lissner, August 14, 1918; Johnson to C. K. McClatchy, July 2, 16, August 7, 1918, all in Johnson Papers.