Fort Missoula, an old military post in Montana, was refurbished in early 1941 to hold Axis nationals who might be detained in this country in the advent of war between their countries and the United States. Beginning in mid-December 1941, just after the declaration of war, some immigrant aliens, primarily Italians alleged to be dangerous to national security, were interned here. By the end of January 1942, the camp held 1,400 Italian nationals and about 250 immigrant aliens. All Italians were released after Italy's surrender to the Allied forces in September 1943. Courtesy Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066 AND ITALIAN AMERICANS: The San Francisco Story

by Rose D. Scherini

In 1982, the U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (cwric) recommended that redress payments be made to all Japanese Americans who had been relocated forty years earlier during World War II. The commission found that the relocation, authorized by Executive Order 9066, was “not justified by military necessity.” In the wake of the commission’s findings and a federal court decision invalidating convictions of Japanese Americans who refused to be relocated, Congress in 1988 ordered that redress payments be made to Japanese Americans who had been wrongfully removed during the war. A single chapter in the commission’s 350-page report dealt with the internment of German Americans, with some references to Italian Americans. Now, almost fifty years after the event, most Americans still do not know that several thousand Italian and German Americans, some of them U.S. citizens, were declared “dangerous,” and they were ordered to move from coastal states or were interned in military camps.1

Historians have only recently begun to tell the story of these other internments. Similar to the Japanese experience, the lives of Italians and Germans were disrupted—they lost their jobs and their homes. Both citizens and aliens were affected. Many families were separated. Because only certain Italian (and German) Americans were singled out as dangerous to military security, they were stigmatized as individuals.2

Executive Order 9066, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 19, 1942, authorized the secretary of war to “designate military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded,” thus allowing the removal of both citizens and aliens. This marked the first time in U.S. history that such action was taken. Earlier legislation—the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and the Alien Enemies Act of 1918 and 1940—did not apply to naturalized citizens. Government memoranda suggest that 9066 was designed to evacuate even U.S.-born Japanese Americans, but was not meant to apply to other enemy aliens. However, it became the basis for excluding other naturalized citizens. These exclusions took place despite considerable controversy within the government over the executive order’s intent and application. Italian Americans in the San Francisco area were affected by this exclusion policy during World War II. Historical precedents and ancient prejudices, moreover, led to these actions. New evidence suggests that these individuals were not “dangerous” persons, and that decisions made to intern or exclude them were invalid.3

When the country entered the war against Japan, Germany, and Italy, the government automatically classified as “enemy aliens” all immigrants from those countries who were not yet naturalized citizens. They were subject to apprehension based on statutes enacted in World War I upon a precedent dating from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. At the beginning of World War II, two thousand Italian and German enemy aliens, referred to in this article as “internees,” were interned. In 1940, there were six hundred thousand Italian aliens in the country, including fifty-two thousand in California. Immigrants at that time could become U.S. citizens after six years’ residence in the country; at other times, the waiting period has been as long as thirteen years. Among Italian and German Americans who were already naturalized citizens before the war, two hundred and fifty-four, about fifteen to twenty percent of whom were Italian, were designated as dangerous and were ordered to move out of coastal states. In this article they are referred to as “excludees.” Although the exact number of non-Japanese who were interned or excluded is not clear in government records, more than 2,000 individuals were removed.

This account of what happened to Italian Americans from the San Francisco area is based on
This building at 801 Silver Avenue in San Francisco, later occupied by Simpson College, was an immigrant detention facility in the 1940s. As Italians and other “enemy aliens” were arrested on and after December 7, 1941, they were held, often in handcuffs, at this center. From here, they were transferred by train under armed guard to inland internment camps. Courtesy Stephen Fox, Humboldt State University.

Interviews with excludees; family members of internees and excludees; FBI files (obtained through the Freedom of Information Act); wartime records in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.; newspaper accounts; and publications on the Japanese American relocation.4

What happened to Italian Americans when the United States entered WWII had historical precedence dating back before WWI. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, this government already had in place a contingency plan to detain dangerous or potentially dangerous civilians in case of national emergency. Since 1936, at the direction of President Roosevelt, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the offices of Army and Naval intelligence had been compiling custodial detention lists that named members of Nazi and Fascist groups, Shinto Buddhist priests, and others. Similar lists had been compiled just before World War I, when 4,000 German aliens were interned. Therefore, on the night of December 7, several hundred Japanese, German, and Italian Americans whose names were on these lists were apprehended nationwide on orders of the attorney general in Washington. Within two months, 3,000 resident aliens, including about 260 Italians, were interned. Some reports about these arrests appeared in San Francisco and New York newspapers, but the war in the Pacific overshadowed most other news.5

One internee described his experience in a letter to a relative many years later:

I was the first one arrested in San Jose the night of the attack on Pearl Harbor. At 11 p.m. three policemen came to the front door and two at the back. They told me that, by order of President Roosevelt, I must go with them. They didn’t even give me time to go to my room and put on my shoes. I was wearing slippers. They took me to prison...and finally to Missoula, Montana, on the train, over the snow, still with slippers on my feet, the temperature at 17 below and no coat or heavy clothes!!6

Neither the arrestees nor their families were given any reason for the arrests, nor were they informed of what would follow. Aliens apprehended in the San Francisco area were held in a temporary detention center on Silver Avenue in the city (recently the site of Simpson Bible College), then taken to an Immigration Service facility at Sharp Park (now in the town of Pacifica), and eventually transported under guard by train to Fort Missoula, Montana. There, an old military fort had already been
refurbished and expanded to hold about one thousand Italian nationals, primarily merchant mariners whose ships had been impounded in Atlantic ports in the spring of 1941.7

For several years, I have been investigating the story behind the arrests and internments of Italian Americans in the Bay Area. I have learned that most, if not all, of these "dangerous" aliens were, in fact, loyal persons whose associations and pre-war relations with Italy were based on emotional, not political, ties. They were responsible members of their community. Many had children born here, and would never have done anything to harm this country. The FBI reports that I have seen contain many incorrect facts or misinterpretations of innocent actions that were clearly legitimate before the war. For example, an employee of the Italian Consulate in San Francisco, with a U.S.-born child and a naturalized wife, was reported for requesting dates of arrival of all Italian ships. This was part of his job, which had ended in June 1941, when the consulate closed. A writer for the Italian-language weekly L’Italia, which had been openly pro-Mussolini before United States entry into the war, was apparently suspect because of his alleged pro-Fascist writings. He was a drama critic. An announcer for a local Italian-language radio program was similarly suspect for alleged "fascist remarks.” He was a known anti-Fascist with a sardonic wit.8 Soon after the apprehensions of the “dangerous” enemy aliens, restrictions were imposed on all enemy aliens and, later, for selected naturalized citizens. Over the next two months, a series of regulations for enemy aliens was issued by the Department of Justice and by the Army’s Western Defense Command. The first restriction on all enemy aliens was a ban on ownership of guns, cameras, and short-wave radios. Then curfew and travel restrictions were imposed: enemy aliens had to be in their homes between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., and were allowed to travel no more than five miles away. Moreover, they were required to register as “enemy aliens” and to carry photo identity cards. Large groups of Italian Americans in the San Francisco area, especially fishermen, restaurant workers, and janitors, lost their employment because of the curfew and travel restrictions. The worst blow came with the order that enemy aliens residing in designated zones along the coast and around military bases had to move out of those areas. Thousands, many elderly, had to move away from their homes, sometimes only to the next block, often to another city or county.9

Executive Order 9066, enacted in mid-February 1942, then resulted in the wholesale evacuation of all Japanese Americans in military areas designated by the Western Defense Command. After the Japanese relocation was completed, consideration was given to evacuating the German and Italian American populations. However, because of the difficulties in removing several million aliens, the political implications of such actions, and the impact their internment might have on the country’s morale, the only additional step taken against any non-Japanese was the Individual Exclusion Program, affecting foreign-born, naturalized U.S. citizens. Two hundred fifty-four persons were excluded nationally. In California, only twenty-four Italian Americans, primarily in San Francisco, received exclusion orders, although many more were called before hearing boards.10

The Individual Exclusion Program was initiated by the Western Defense Command, headed by Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, whose concerns about a Japanese invasion—based not on intelligence but on racism and rumors—promoted the evacuation of all Japanese. DeWitt also advocated wholesale removal of the Italian and German populations, but was not supported by Washington. In 1940, Italian Americans constituted the largest foreign ethnic group in the United States and German Americans were the second largest. So, instead of evacuating these groups, the Army used the exclusion program to remove only those persons allegedly dangerous to military security.11

The exclusion process worked like this: using pre-war detention lists of suspect persons and organizations and other information, the combined intelligence agencies recommended that specified “potentially dangerous” persons be considered for exclusion, and a hearing was set by the Civil Affairs Division of the Army’s Wartime Civil Control Administration.12

The selected men and women received notices reading as follows:

You are hereby notified that a Board of Officers has been appointed by the Commanding General . . . to consider the question whether military necessity requires the issuance of an order excluding you from certain military areas. . . . You are further notified that on [a date one week ahead] this Board

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will be convened. . . . You may be accompanied by counsel . . . but he will not be heard by the Board nor be permitted to examine witnesses. . . .13

There is little documentation of what took place in these exclusion hearings; the records of hearings were destroyed. According to government reports and eyewitness accounts, the hearings lasted twenty to thirty minutes; the accused were not given the reasons for the proposed exclusion; they could not testify on their own behalf, except to answer questions posed by the army officers, though character witnesses were allowed to make statements. Within a month after the hearing, the FBI served the exclusion orders giving the individuals only ten days to decide where to go, to settle their affairs, and to move from all restricted

L'Italia, the major Italian-language newspaper in northern California during the first half of this century, had its offices in San Francisco on Columbus Avenue, the heart of the Italian American neighborhood in North Beach. Several of the newspaper's staff were excluded or interned in 1941 and 1942. Ettore Patrizi, editor and publisher for fifty-nine years, is shown in his office in 1917. He was served with an exclusion order in 1942, when he was seventy-seven years old. Courtesy Andrew M. Canepa. Photo reproduction by Instructional Media Center, CSU, Hayward.
coastal and military areas. Several of the San Francisco Italians went to Reno, the nearest city with prospects of employment, and others to Chicago, Salt Lake City, Denver, and St. Louis. Thereafter, they were required to report regularly to local FBI offices. 

Soon after some excludees had moved to Reno, there were discussions among some Army officers in the Civil Affairs Division as to the advisability of allowing these "dangerous" persons to relocate in Reno. One officer wrote in a memo that Reno "had the reputation of being the hideout for the criminal element of the entire country" and was near vital railways, highway bridges, and a naval ammunition dump. Another officer responded that if Reno were added to the prohibited zones, Chicago and St. Louis should also be included, since they were "underworld pockmarks." The decision was made that unless the prohibited areas remained limited to the coastal states, this could become a never-ending process; that military installations were already well guarded; and that FBI surveillance of excludees should intercept any espionage activities. (This, of course, would also have been true if these men and women had been allowed to remain in their own homes.)

Some excludees were also investigated for denaturalization, i.e., recision of status as United States citizens. None of the persons in my study were denaturalized, however, although most were considered for this action. The Justice Department's requirements for initiation of denaturalization proceedings included producing evidence of (1) "specific statements, writings or acts . . . reflecting disloyalty to the U.S., allegiance to and connection with Axis countries or lack of attention to the principles of the Constitution of the U.S. . . . evidence of such facts occurring after the declaration of war or soon after the date of naturalization would have great probative value"; (2) organizational activities of a subversive nature; and (3) financial transactions with Axis countries or lack of attention to the principles of the Constitution of the U.S. . . . evidence of such facts occurring after the declaration of war or soon after the date of naturalization would have great probative value"; (2) organizational activities of a subversive nature; and (3) financial transactions with Axis countries. In view of the fact that many excludees were never denaturalized, one might conclude that the evidence used to exclude them did not contain such serious acts of disloyalty.

On Columbus Day, October 12, 1942, just weeks before the congressional elections, a surprise announcement was made by the Attorney General: Italian immigrant aliens were no longer subject to curfew and travel regulations. Apparently this was an acknowledgment that Italian Americans had acted responsibly in the war effort and that the federal government had determined they did not endanger the war effort. It was also related to the expectation of Italy's early surrender and the consequent need for support of Italian Americans in the occupation of Italy. This was especially critical because Italian Americans were the largest ethnic group of foreign descent in the army. The changed general status of Italian American aliens, however, did not apply to individual internees or excludees.

Who were these "dangerous" Italian Americans? As individuals, they had little in common except membership in certain ethnic organizations or employment within the Italian American community. It was a small group: in the West only twenty-four Italian Americans were excluded and perhaps one hundred were interned. Most of them had emigrated after World War I and were veterans of that war in Italy. Many belonged to the Federation of Italian War Veterans of the U.S.A. (also known as the Italian Legion), which was affiliated with a parent organization in Italy, Associazione di Ex-Combattenti, and on the list of suspect organizations.

I collected data on twenty-eight men and four women. Of these, nineteen were excluded, thirteen interned. Government agency records have been located for twenty-six of them; nine FBI files have been obtained. All subjects are now deceased. I held interviews with two excludees themselves and six family members of excludees and internees. Some relatives refuse to talk about this episode in their families' lives; they are angry and feel it still as a stigma. Others are eager to talk in order to set the record straight; they hope that making this story public will help prevent such actions in the future.

When WWII began, the men and women in this study were employed in various occupations: banker, journalist, radio announcer, attorney, teacher, janitor, and small business owner. Many were local community leaders, active in Sons of Italy, the Italian Language School in San Francisco, and the Italian Chamber of Commerce. Many of these organizations were listed by the government as suspect, apparently because they received financing from the Italian Consulate, or, on the other hand, sent funds to Italy for various causes or in some other way indicated they supported...
the Fascist government of Italy. Eight men were reported on intelligence lists as members of the National Fascist Party in the United States or the Fascist League of North America, both of which had disbanded in 1929. Others named on the intelligence lists, however, were ordinary people who led quiet lives and participated in ethnic organizations primarily for recreational purposes. Most of the Italians in my study had United States-born children; some had non-Italian spouses. To the best of my knowledge, none had a police record.

The apparently ordinary background of internees and excludees raises the question of why these particular individuals were singled out as being potentially “dangerous.” There was in 1940, after all, a population of 12,000 Italian immigrant aliens in San Francisco alone, and 52,000 in the state.¹⁹

The answer lies in part in two other pieces of legislation enacted by Congress just before the war. The first was the Alien Registration Act, known as the Smith Act, passed in June 1940, requiring all aliens to register, provide information about their membership in organizations, and report any changes in their residence. As a result, the government was inundated with information on resident aliens, making it difficult to distinguish clearly among individuals, a problem compounded when the war broke out and enemy aliens were required to re-register and carry photo identity cards. Then Congress passed the Voorhis Act in October 1941, which required that organizations “subject to foreign control” register with the attorney general. Soliciting or accepting foreign contributions, or “affiliation with a foreign government,” was considered “subject to foreign control.”²⁰

Another event that led to the later exclusions of specific individuals took place in spring 1942 when the state legislature’s Un-American Activities Committee, known as the Tenney Committee, held hearings in San Francisco. The committee’s mission included investigating organizations whose members belonged to the Communist Party, Fascist groups, the Nazi Bund, or any other group “dominated or controlled by a foreign power that might affect the State’s preparation for national defense.” Most, perhaps all, of the Italian Americans later excluded from San Francisco, had either been subpoenaed by the committee or named as Fascists by other witnesses, providing later federal investigators with a convenient, if untested, list of “dangerous” persons in this ethnic group.²¹

An understanding of what happened at the Tenney Committee’s hearings requires some knowledge of the politics of San Francisco’s Italian American community. Like other Americans, Italian immigrants in the 1930s focused on their own economic problems, and they were more interested in Roosevelt than in Mussolini. In San Francisco, a small but influential group of active pro-Fascists was represented in the Italian-language newspaper L’Italia, and an even smaller group of outspoken anti-Fascists, in Il Corriere del Popolo. At the Tenney hearings, Carmelo Zito, Corriere’s socialist editor, testified that L’Italia and its editor-publisher, Ettore Patrizi, were Fascists who received financing from the Italian Consulate. Zito also named other individuals and organizations as supporters of Fascism in Italy prior to United States entry into the war.²²
The testimony at these hearings reflected disagreement in the local Italian community over Fascist ideas, statements, and writings during the 1930s, but not subversive activities, espionage, or sabotage. Nevertheless, the committee reported that, while it had “barely scratched the surface of subversive activities in California,” its conclusion was that the “Italian Fascist Movement in California” was directed from San Francisco by three persons: L’Italia’s publisher, Ettore Patrizi, and two prominent attorneys, Sylvester Andriano and Renzo Turco. All three were later excluded by the Army, presumably on the basis of this testimony, as well as their membership in suspect organizations.23

Ettore Patrizi was seventy-seven years old at the time and in ill health. A United State citizen since 1899, he was married to a second-generation Italian American, a patron of the opera, a respected community leader, and, prior to U.S. entry into the war, openly pro-Mussolini. Patrizi moved to Reno in October 1942, but due to bad health, he was allowed to return to San Francisco a year later.24

Sylvester Andriano, another so-called Fascist leader, was an attorney and former member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, former library commissioner, and ironically, at the time of his exclusion hearing, a police commissioner and chairman of a draft board. He had, however, held leadership positions in at least two suspect groups: the Italian Language School and the Italian Chamber of Commerce. Also, the Italian Consulate was one of his clients. Moreover, federal intelligence agencies listed him as a member of the German-American Bund (this seems unlikely) and as a member of the Italian War Veterans (impossible, since he was in the United States during World War I). He had emigrated with his parents in 1901 when he was 11 years old, became a citizen in 1912, and received a law degree in 1915. Almost twenty years after his exclusion, Andriano was named “alumnus of the year” by St. Mary’s College, in Moraga, California. His participation in the Italian Chamber of Commerce was mentioned as one of his achievements.25

Renzo Turco, the other attorney named in the Tenney report, was also a highly respected community leader and founder of Il Cenacolo, a men’s business and professional club that still meets in San Francisco. He had already received a law degree in Italy when he emigrated in 1920. He became a naturalized citizen in 1926 and obtained a second law degree at the University of California, Berkeley.

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Sylvester Andriano, fourth from left, is shown at the first meeting of the San Francisco Police Commission, to which he was appointed in 1937 by Mayor Angelo Rossi (far left). Others at the meeting were commission president J. Ward Maillard, Commissioner Frank C. Sykes, Police Chief William Quinn, and Deputy Police Chief Charles Skelly. Courtesy History Room, San Francisco Public Library.
Renzo Turco, named in 1942 by the California Legislature's Un-American Activities Committee as one of the "leaders" of the "Fascist movement" in the state, was an international lawyer. Active and highly visible in San Francisco's Italian American community, he was a charter member of the local Italian American War Veterans chapter, and the founder of Il Cenacolo, a businessmen's weekly luncheon organization that still meets in North Beach. In this photo, taken about 1930, Renzo (second from left) is shown as an amateur actor in an Italian theater group. Courtesy Andrew M. Canepa.

Active in suspect organizations, Turco was listed as a member of the Fascist League of North America in the 1920s. When interviewed thirty years after his exclusion, he still did not know the basis for his exclusion. He described what happened when he moved to Chicago: he reported to the FBI, as instructed—they had not heard of him! He could not find a job—probably because he was required to inform prospective employers of his "dangerous alien" status—until a letter of recommendation from a San Francisco judge got him a position at the Internal Revenue Service.²⁶

Other men and women were deemed "dangerous" apparently only because they held membership in the Italian War Veterans or its women's auxiliary. Government documents describe the organization as "subject to . . . Rome and in close contact with all Italian Consulates and other Fascist organizations in this country, . . . and many of its members held membership cards in the Fascist Party." Other Italian American societies were also openly pro-Mussolini, and it is not clear why the IWV was singled out. Perhaps it was because the organization had collected funds for widows
and orphans of the 1935 Italo-Ethiopian War. In North Beach (then the Italian district), older residents remember collection baskets in shops where women donated gold wedding rings "to help Italy." In 1940, the IWV was still sending money to Italy. The organization marched in Fourth of July parades, and was well known to the American Legion, whose members informed on ethnic groups for the FBI during that era.27

Although general pro-Mussolini statements by Italian Americans were interpreted by intelligence agencies as anti-United States, those opinions were expressed in a time when Mussolini was a relatively popular figure in this country, even among many non-Italians. Mussolini’s autobiography ran in the widely-circulated Saturday Evening Post and its May 5, 1928, cover pictured him striding along a beach. A 1934 Cole Porter hit song with the line “You’re the tops, You are Mussolini” was changed only after Italy invaded Ethiopia the following year. Even some FBI reports concluded that “readiness to defend all things Italian is often interpreted as pro-Fascist by certain groups” and that “whatever pro-Fascist movement had existed collapsed
completely when the United States became an active participant in the war." 

Finally, what contributed to the indiscriminate internments and exclusions of certain ethnic groups on the West Coast was what appeared to be an imminent threat of Japanese invasion. Try to recall, or reconstruct, what it must have been like in the months after Pearl Harbor. Japan was winning the war in the Pacific. People along the coast feared bombing or invasion; there was some Japanese submarine shelling. Pressure mounted to evacuate the Japanese American population, and, in case of invasion, the Army also considered Germans and Italians a danger. While the Justice Department opposed actions against citizens, and the public voiced almost no sentiment against German and Italian Americans, in the first anxious and confused months of the war the Army was allowed final say even over citizens' rights. 

What conclusions can be drawn from this wartime episode? Most basically, it illustrates a persistent misunderstanding of immigrants that has existed in this country, in 1798 with the Alien and Sedition Acts, during World War I and World War II, and still pervades national thinking even today—witness the conflicts over bilingual education and the drive to make English the official language in California and several other states. The misunderstanding is that immigrants' attachment to their homeland, their desire for their children to know the ancestral language, and their maintenance of family traditions are evidence of a rejection of the American way of life. Rather, these are natural manifestations of coping mechanisms, whose purpose is to cushion the cultural shock that Italian and other immigrants since the seventeenth century have experienced in their transition to a new language and country. Social anthropologists

![Enemy nationals and immigrant aliens arriving at the Missoula, Montana, internment camp, ca. 1942. Courtesy Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library, University of Montana.](image-url)
and immigrants' children know that immigrants do not instantly become American. It is normal and necessary for immigrants to belong for a while to two cultures; it takes new generations, born here, to complete the transition. The Italian American writer, Jerre Mangione, quotes an immigrant relative's reaction to his classification as "enemy alien": "Don't those imbeciles in Washington understand that to have American-born children is to become an American for the rest of your life?"\(^{30}\)

Although a relatively small number of Italian Americans were interned or excluded—compared to the 110,000 Japanese Americans—individual families and the North Beach community suffered greatly from this experience. For the families, there was a stigma attached to being singled out as "dangerous to national security." Some family members still won't talk about it. For the community, the exile of many of its leaders, and the undermining of the organizations contributed to the eventual disintegration of this ethnic enclave.\(^ {31}\)

Finally, can this happen again in the United States, even after the enactment of legislation awarding financial redress to the Japanese Americans? Unfortunately, it can. Ancient attitudes toward foreigners still prevail; legislation permitting emergency detention of aliens is still on the books; and detention lists may still be compiled. Even though the attorney general directed in 1943 that such lists be abolished and that classification of persons as dangerous "in the abstract" was invalid, later FBI records reveal that such classification continues.\(^ {32}\)

Evidence of the persistent mistrust of immigrants' loyalties is still found in government policy, as shown in three examples of numerous similar occurrences. The first, a 1946 memo to the attorney general advised that in case of "sudden difficulty with Russia," the government could, on the basis of current statutes, apprehend "not only all nationals of the USSR," but also "all persons who are now or have at any time in the past been members of the Communist Party or of any party, organization, faction or group which advocates the overthrow of the government of the U.S. or adherence to the policies and programs of its enemies." The second illustration comes from the 1981 testimony of John J. McCloy before the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. McCloy had been assistant secretary of war during World War II and later held a number of important governmental posts. When asked if he thought evacuation of civilians should ever be carried out again, McCloy said that he could envision a situation such as conflict with Cuba when we should "move out all those Cubans in Florida." It is sobering to realize that in the early 1980s, a recent American governmental leader believed that anti-Castro Cubans in Florida should be evacuated in case of conflict with Castro's Cuba. Third, and even more recently, American involvement in the Iraq-Kuwait war of 1990 and 1991, with the threat of retaliatory sabotage directed at the United States, caused many groups and individuals to call for the detention of Arab Americans.\(^ {33}\)